Abstract This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and with pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are assumed to be Perfect Predictors, in the sense that their predictions are correct in all possible worlds. Concretely, this means that a player's decision is perfectly correlated with its anticipation by other players, unlike in Nash equilibra where the decisions are made independently. The equilibrium, when it exists, is unique and is Pareto optimal.
Introduction
On the planet Betazed, a member of the United Federation of Planets, people have telepathic powers. The prisoner's dilemma is not a problem to Betazoids: they cooperate, as it is quite obvious to them. They can read each other's minds, which leads to a perfect correlation in their decisions. The assumption underlying the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) , namely that the opponent's strategy is kept frozen and fixed while optimizing one's payoff, does not apply to them: indeed, any change of strategy leads to an instantaneous change of strategy of the opponent. Defect, and the opponent defects. Cooperate, and they cooperate as well.
Thankfully, we do not need to wait until the twenty-fourth century to learn from these people and obtain better payoffs in social dilemma. Hofstadter (1983) introduced the concept of superrationality. The main idea behind superrationality is that the players have such a high level of awareness of their rationality, and of their common knowledge thereof, and of their own reasonings, that they are able to reason on a meta-level, taking into account that the opponent's is reasoning in the exact same way. In Douglas Hofstadter's words:
"If reasoning dictates an answer, then everyone should independently come to that answer. Seeing this fact is itself the critical step in the reasoning toward the correct answer [...] . Once you realize this fact, then it dawns on you that either all rational players will choose D or all rational players will choose C. This is the crux.
Any number of ideal rational thinkers faced with the same situation and undergoing similar throes of reasoning agony will necessarily come up with the identical answer eventually, so long as reasoning alone is the ultimate justification for their conclusion. Otherwise reasoning would be subjective, not objective as arithmetics is. A conclusion reached by reasoning would be a matter of preference, not of necessity." Superrational thinkers start with the assumption that there is only one rational strategy, and use the laws of logics to find it. Because the game is symmetric, the rational strategies must be identical on both sides, so that the final outcome will necessary be on the diagonal. Knowing this, it is straightforward that the reasonable course of action is, for both players, to pick that strategy that leads to the optimal strategy profile on the diagonal (Figure 1 ). This is the one rational strategy, confirming the initial assumption. It is crucial to understand that the correlation of the decisions that leads to both players cooperating in the prisoner's dilemma is not built on any supernatural telepathic powers: it is solely based on the universality of the laws of mathematics and logics.
Towards non-symmetric games: Perfect Prediction
The Hofstadter equilibrium is only defined for symmetric games, as the limitation of the reasoning to the diagonal payoffs needs the assumption of symmetry. However, there are other ways than symmetry to reason towards the Hofstadter equilibrium.
The notion of Superrationality is tied to that of Perfect Prediction: if reasoning dictates that only one outcome is reasonable, then this outcome is common knowledge as soon as the agents have perfect logical skills. Initial work by (Dupuy, 2000) showed that full transparency can be achieved by assuming that players make correct predictions in all possible worlds (perfect prediction) rather than only in the actual world (ad-hoc prediction). Dupuy (1992) called this framework Projected Time.
Perfection Prediction thus means that the agents' predictions are correct not only profactually, but also counterfactually. The agents know the solution of the game in advance, and would also have known the solution of the game if the solution had been different. They are correct in all possible worlds and reason as if they knew as much as omniscient external observers. Finally, as Dupuy points out, it is enough to assume that the players believe that they are Perfect Predictors: the prediction of the actual outcome of the game itself relies solely on mathematical and logical computations, and is a consequence of the at-most uniqueness of the outcome that can possibly be reached under this belief. Fourny et al (2014) defined the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE) on games in extensive form. This equilibrium is reached by players that are Perfect Predictors. The PPE is the only outcome in the tree that is immune against its common knowledge. It is obtained by iterated elimination of outcomes that can provably not be known as the solution of the game. Such outcomes are said to be preempted.
The reasoning behind Perfect Prediction is closely related to the elapse of time: saying that the solution must be immune to its common knowledge actually amounts to say that the solution must be caused by its common knowledge, like a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Perfect Prediction Equilibrium in extensive form has one more constraint: as the game is organized in a tree, a player's decision at a node n must lie in the future light cone of the previous player's picking that node n at the parent node. In relativity theory terms, the anticipation of the other player's move and the actual move are thus timelike-separated. In extensive form, the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium must thus deal with Grandfather's paradoxes.
In normal form, however, time plays a lesser role, as the decisions are made in parallel and without communication. However, the concept of preemption can be directly extended to reasonings in normal forms: with decisions being spacelike-separated. In normal form, there are two steps in time: in a first step, the players make their decisions in parallel, in a second step, these decisions are taken in order to deduce the final payoffs. The essence of reasoning in normal form is that the players attempt to predict each other's decisions in order to anticipate their final payoff. The difference between Nash Equilibria and the equilibrium defined in this paper, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium (PTE) lies in the prediction models.
Going back to the example of the prisoner's dilemma, shown on Figure 1 , we can start the reasoning, under the assumption of Perfect Prediction, by asking the question: can the non-diagonal outcome (0,3), reached when the row player cooperates and the column player defects, be commonly known as the solution of the game? The answer is no: as defecting would guarantee the row player a minimum payoff of 1, as opposed to 0, (0,3) cannot be the reasonable solution. If it were, then the row player would not pick a strategy compatible with it: (0,3) is said to be preempted.
At this first stage, the definition of preemption is identical to that of individual rationality. Neither (0,3) nor (3,0) are individually rational, both are preempted. The key part of superrational thinking is the awareness of the fact that these two outcomes cannot be the solutions of the game. The players thus know that, if they cooperate, then the other does as well, and if they defect, the other does as well. Only (1,1) and (2,2) are left, and after a second round of elimination only (2,2) remains.
This line of reasoning reaches the same outcome as Douglas Hofstadter's reasoning, but does not use the argument of symmetry. It can thus be extended to other games in normal form. This is what we are going to do now.
The equilibrium and its properties
The context in which we define the PTE is that of games in normal form, with a few additional assumptions similar to that of its extensive form counterpart.
Games in normal form
First, we need a formal definition of games in normal form.
Definition 1 (Game in normal form)
A game in normal form is defined with:
-a finite set of players P .
-a set of strategies Σ i for each player i ∈ P .
-a specification of payoffs u i ( − → σ ) for each player i ∈ P and strategy profile − → σ = (σ j ) j∈P .
We will only consider pure strategies, meaning that players may not use randomness to build mixed strategies. The outcome of a game must thus always be on of the strategy profiles of the normal form matrix, with each player getting the corresponding payoff.
Furthermore, in this paper, we assume that there are no ties, meaning that a player always has a strict preference between any two strategy profiles.
Payoffs only have an ordinal meaning, which is why in all our examples we use an increasing sequence of small integers.
The players do not cooperate. They act selfishly, but accept and use the laws of logics.
Finally, the game is only played once: this is not a repeated-game equilibrium.
In the case of the PTE, we also further assume that both players believe that they are Perfect Predictors, i.e., that their predictions are correct in all possible worlds. It is very important to note that we do not assume that the opponent's strategy is fixed while maximizing one's payoff, as is done in Nash equilibria.
Superrational (Hofstadter) equilibrium
We also need a definition of the Hofstadter equillibrium, as defined in (Hofstadter, 1983) . This is needed to compare it with the PTE on symmetric games.
Definition 2 (Hofstadter equilibrium) Given a symmetric game in normal form, a strategy profile − → σ is an equilibrium reached by Superrational players (a Hofstadter equilibrium) if:
-the strategy profile is on the diagonal: ∃υ ∈ Υ, − → σ = (υ, υ, ..., υ) which we can also express as
-it maximizes the payoff on the diagonal
We are unsure of how Hofstadter would describe superrational behavior in games with ties, as several equilibria may emerge, contradicting the premise of the reasoning. However, in this paper, we assume that games have no ties.
Preemption
The PTE is based on iterated elimination of strategy profiles that cannot be possibly known as the solution of the game, because players would otherwise deviate. We need to define the notion of preemption. This is very similar to the reasoning of the PPE in extensive form games (Fourny et al, 2014) .
Informally, a strategy profile − → τ is preempted by a strategy σ i (of any player i) if player i is worse off with − → τ than with the minimum payoff that she is assured to get with σ i .
The most efficient elimination scheme is obtained by finding the maximin utility. The concept of maximin utility is commonly found in game theory literature, and is used in the definition of individual rationality 1 . Each strategy has a minimum guaranteed payoff (no matter what the opponents would do), and the maximin utility for a given player is the maximal utility among these minimum guaranteed payoffs.
All strategy profiles that do not Pareto dominate the maximin utility, that is, that are not individually rational, are preempted. Indeed, if a strategy profile does not Pareto dominate the maximin utility, it means that the player who would be worse off with this strategy profile could simply deviate to the strategy that guarantees him his maximin utility. In other words, the first round of elimination is as simple as eliminating all strategy profiles that are not individually rational.
In subsequent rounds of eliminations, only strategy profiles that survived previous rounds can be considered for computing the minimums in the maximin utility. Also, a strategy cannot preempt any longer if all the strategy profiles it contains have been eliminated -it can thus no longer be considered in the computation of the maximum in the maximin utility 2 . The impossibility to preempt with a strategy leading to an empty set of surviving outcomes is identical to what happens in extensive form in the PPE reasoning.
We start with the definition of the first round of elimination, which is, as we said, identical to that of individual rationality.
Definition 3 (1 st -level-preempted strategy profile) Given a game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, a strategy profile is 1 stlevel-preempted if it is not individually rational. In other words, any strategy profile that does not Pareto-dominate the maximin utility is 1 st -levelpreempted. For a game Γ , the strategy profiles − → σ ∈ S 1 (Γ ) that survive the first round of elimination are characterized with:
We now give the definition of subsequent rounds, when we no longer consider previously eliminated strategy profiles.
Definition 4 (k th -level-preempted strategy profile) Given a game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, a strategy profile is k thlevel-preempted, for k > 1, if it does not Pareto-dominate the maximin utility, where the maximin is only taking into account strategy profiles that are not (k − 1)
th -level preempted. The strategy profiles − → σ ∈ S k (Γ ) that survived the k th round of elimination are characterized with:
The iterated elimination converges at some point.
Lemma 1 (Convergence) The sequence of sets (S i (Γ )) i∈N converges and reaches its limit: at a certain point, no more strategy profiles get eliminated.
We denote this limit S(Γ )
Proof (Convergence) The maximin utility, in each round, Pareto-dominates the previous one. This is because the minima are taken over decreasing sets and can thus only increase, and thus the maxima can also only increase as well. Since the sequence is decreasing and has its values in a finite set (in the powerset of all strategy profiles), it must converge and reach its limit.
Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium
We can now give a definition of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for games in normal form, and characterize it with the previous sequence of sets of surviving strategy profiles.
Definition 5 (Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium for games in normal form) Given a game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, a Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune against its common knowledge, with the understanding that agents are Perfect Predictors. The set of Perfectly Transparent Equilibria is S(Γ ).
The algorithm for computing the PTE for any game in normal form and with no ties follows: one iteratively eliminates, in each round, all strategy profiles that do not Pareto dominate the current tuple of maximin utilities.
Results
We now give a few results concerning the PTE on games in normal form.
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness) Given a game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, if the PTE exists, then it is unique.
It is important to note that the equilibrium does not always exists. We provide counterexamples in Section 4.
Proof (Uniqueness)
The sequence (S i (Γ )) i∈N is strictly decreasing until either the empty set or a singleton is reached. This is because there are no ties: for any player, the current maximin utility must, by definition of the max, be strictly greater than one of the payoffs for a different strategy (which exists for at least one player if the current set is not a singleton). The corresponding strategy profile will be eliminated in the next round. As a consequence, the sequence can only converge towards a singleton (this is the unique PTE of the game) or the empty set (there are no PTEs for the game).
Theorem 2 (Pareto optimality) Given a game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, if the PTE exists, then it is Pareto-optimal amongst all strategy profiles.
Proof (Pareto optimality) If an existing PTE were not Pareto-optimal, then there would be a distinct strategy profile that Pareto-dominates the PTE. But this strategy profile would not have been eliminated in the last strictly decreasing round of elimination, because it would also Pareto-dominate the current tuple of maximin utilities and be a PSSPE as well. This contradicts uniqueness.
Theorem 3 (Coincidence with Hofstadter's equilibrium on symmetric games) Given a symmetric game in normal form, with pure strategies and with no ties, if the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium exists, then it is identical to Hofstadter's equilibrium.
Proof (Coincidence with Hofstadter's equilibrium on symmetric games) Assume the PTE exists for a given game. In a symmetric game, the PTE must be on the diagonal. This is because, if the PTE were not on the diagonal, one would obtain another distinct PTE by swapping the role of the players. This would contradict uniqueness. Thus, the PTE lies on the diagonal. Since it must be Pareto-optimal, it must be correspond to the maximum diagonal payoff and coincide with the Hofstadter equillibrium, as non-maximum diagonal payoffs are Pareto-dominated by the Hofstadter equillibrium. Figure 2 gives the detail of the reasoning on the Prisoner's dilemma. 2,3) is the unique PTE and is immune against the common knowledge that it is the PTE.
Examples and Counterexamples

Prisoner's dilemma
In the first round, the maximin utilities are (1,1). Strategy profiles CD and DC are thus eliminated: it is not possible that any of them be known as the final equilibrium of the game, as the cooperating player would deviate instead, contradicting that it would be the equillibrium.
In the second round, the new maximin utilities are (2,2).
(1,1) is thus eliminated: if it were known to be the solution, both players would cooperate instead.
(2,2) is the PTE. Figure 3 gives the detail of the reasoning on an asymmetric game. This game has a PTE as we will see. In the first round, the maximin utilities are (1,1). Strategy profiles AC and AD are thus eliminated: it is not possible that any of them be known as the final equilibrium of the game, as the column player would deviate to B instead.
Asymmetric game with a PTE
In the second round, the new maximin utilities are (2,1). BD is thus eliminated: if it were known to be the solution, the row player would pick C instead.
Only (2,3) remains, which is stable against the common knowledge of its PTE-ness. Knowing that (2,3) is the PTE, both players will stick to their strategy based on the above reasoning, as no other strategy profile is reasonable. It is thus the PTE.
(2,2) is the PTE. Figure 4 gives the detail of the reasoning on a the chicken game. In the first round, the maximin utilities are (1,1). Strategy profile AC is thus eliminated: it is not possible that it be known as the final equilibrium of the game, as the column player would deviate to B instead, and the row player to D.
Game with no PTE
In the second round, the new maximin utilities are (3,3). None of the remaining strategy profiles Pareto-dominates (3,3), so that none of them is stable: whichever would be a potential PTE, at least one player would deviate.
The chicken game has no PTE. Figure 5 gives the detail of the reasoning on a symmetric game where the Hofstadter equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
Symmetric game with a Hofstadter equilibrium which is not a PTE
In the first round, the maximin utilities are (1,1). Strategy profile AC is thus eliminated: it is not possible that it be known as the final equilibrium of the game, as the column player would deviate to B instead, and the row player to D.
This game has no PTE. The Hofstadter equillibrium (1,1) is not a PTE and would not be stable against its hypothetical knowledge as the solution of the game.
Links with other non-Nashian Concepts
There is a growing literature of solution concepts in non-Nashian Game Theory. They all have in common the change in assumption: while in the Nash paradigm, the opponent's strategies are held fixed while optimizing one's utility, this line of research assumes correlation between the agent's decisions in one way or another.
Perfect Prediction Equilibrium
Fourny et al (2014) defined the PPE for games in extensive form with perfect information and no ties. It is also known as the Projected Equilibrium, which was the initial named used by Jean-Pierre Dupuy. The PPE is the natural counterpart of the PTE for games in extensive form. It has many features in common. First, it is based on an iterated elimination of preempted outcomes. Preemption is also done using the minimum guaranteed payoff by the strategy or move used to deviate. Like the PTE, the PPE is unique and Pareto-optimal.
However, the PPE differs from the PTE in that it always exists, and must solve Grandfather's paradoxes. In particular, given a game in extensive form and its PPE, if we convert the game to a normal form as is done in Nashian game theory, the PTE of this converted normal form will not always match the PPE. This is because the normal form does not carry the causal dependencies of the extensive forms. While these causal dependencies are not needed in the Nash equilibrium (because the past is counterfactually independent from the future), they are paramount in Perfect Prediction settings: the consistency of the game timeline must be preserved and the successive choices of the players must cause 3 each other: a decision cannot be made at a node n if the player playing at the parent node did not pick n.
Superrationality
Hofstadter (1983) defined superrational equilibria on symmetric games in normal form. As described in this paper, the PTE can be seen as generalizing the Hofstadter equilibrium to non-symmetric games. Also, while the PTE always agrees with the Hofstadter equilibrium when it exists, some symmetric games that have a Hofstadter equilibrium do not have a PTE, as the Hofstadter equilibrium can be preempted in some cases.
Minimax-rationalizability
Halpern and Pass (2013) are interested in translucent players in normal form. Translucency differs from transparency, in that transparency is the ideal case of translucency where knowledge of the opponent's decisions is perfect (Perfect Prediction). Translucent players may only have partial knowledge on the opponent's intentions.
Like in the PTE, for translucent players, there may be some correlation between the agent's actions, so that the results of Nash literature do not necessarily apply. Halpern and Pass define the concept of minimax rationalizability in order to restrict the set of reasonable strategies, but in a less restrictive way than the classical concept of rationalizability. A strategy is not rationalizable if it is not the best response to some opponent's strategy. A strategy is not minimax-rationalizable if its best possible payoff is still lower than the worse possible payoff with an alternate strategy. While rationalizable strategies are always minimax-rationalizable, the converse is not true, as translucency may authorize new behavior.
An open question is whether the PTE is minimax-rationalizable. We fear that it is not, but have yet to find a counter-example. Minimax-rationalizability is based on iterated elimination of strategies, which is also indirectly iterated elimination of strategy profiles, but in entire row or column batches. While it is true that all strategy profiles that get eliminated in the first round in Minimax-rationalizability are also eliminated in the first round in the PTE, the converse is not true and further rounds may start to deviate, converging to different final sets. This is because the order in which we eliminate strategy profiles in the successive rounds may matter: a strategy profile that the PTE eliminates in the first round cannot be used for further preemption. It is thus important in the PTE that, at each round, all strategy profiles that are known to be inconsistent with Perfect Prediction must be eliminated: otherwise, a non-eliminated strategy profile may mistakenly affect (upwards) the maximin utility, eliminating strategy profiles that should not be eliminated.
It is also not known if the PPE in extensive form would be minimaxrationalizable if the game is converted in normal form.
5.4 Shiffrin's Joint-Selfish-Rational equilibrium Shiffrin et al (2009) suggest an alternate approach for the discovery of Pareto optima in extensive form games, the Joint-Selfish-Rational equilibrium (JSRE). The approach differs from the PPE (and PTE) in that outcomes that have been eliminated can still be considered as deviations in subsequent rounds. The JSRE reasoning starts with the Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium, and navigates up and down the tree finding Pareto Optimizations of successive interim equilibria. This leads to the same solution as the PPE in many games, but diverges from the PPE on other games. The JSRE is explained on several examples and has not been fully formalized yet in the general case, but it is suspected that it has an exponential complexity to calculate as the number of players increases.
We believe that the divergence between the PPE and the JSRE is due to a fundamental axiomatic disagreement, in that the PPE reasoning (like the PTE reasoning) is based on the absence of contigencies, due to the uniqueness of the equilibrium, and on reasonings only on the equilibrium path. The JSRE uses counterfactual implications outside the equilibrium path as the SPE does, which we believe make it prone to the Backward Induction Paradox.
Conclusion
This paper builds an explicit connection between the Hofstadter equilibrium for Superrational thinkers and the Perfect Prediction Equillibrium, by generalizing the former to all games in normal form with no ties, and the latter to games in normal form. As mentioned in (Fourny et al, 2014) , we suspected that the PPE was some kind of counterpart of the superrational thinking on games in extensive forms, and the PTE that we have just defined acts here as a missing link between the two.
The non-Nashian assumptions behind the PTE correspond to one-boxer behavior in Newcomb's Paradox, as Dupuy (1992) showed. We believe that these assumptions describe an alternate form of rationality that explains the behavior of some agents that do not follow Nashian predictions. This form of rationality is based on on the belief that decisions are correctly predicted in all possible worlds, and on a Kantian imperative to avoid inconsistencies and seek a consistent timeline where the prediction of the solution of the game causes that solution to be reached, as a self-fulfilling prophecy. This behavior was on several occasions connected to ethical consideration and qualified as a form of "Kantian honesty", in that such agents "never act in such a way that, had their action been anticipated, it would not be in their power to carry it out." 4 . We believe that Non-Nashian equilibria such as the PPE and PTE can be useful to manage the behavior of Artificial Intelligence systems, in order to emulate what could be interpreted as honest behavior. Another argument in favor of using this approach in conjunction with Machine Learning algorithms is the higher-level of reasoning: when the agents that are being predicted are informed of the prediction (valid in one possible world) in advance, they can adapt their behavior and make this prediction false. With the Perfect Prediction setting, the prediction is formally built as a fixpoint and taking the implications of its own anticipation into account.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Perfect Prediction theory happens to itself be a fixpoint: it was built by assuming that it is possible for players to know as much as omniscient observers, and in particular, know the solution of the game in advance in all possible worlds. It then goes on by computing the possible outcomes, by proving that there is only one, thus providing an explicit algorithm to compute the only possible solution of the game, validating the initial assumption.
Acknowledgements
I am first and foremost indebted to Jean-Pierre-Dupuy, who spent decades designing projected time and perfect prediction (which he calls essential prediction) and formulated the initial conjectures, as well as to Stéphane Reiche, with whom we collaborated on the formalism of the PPE in extensive form.
I should also mention Alexei Grinbaum, Bernard Walliser, Rich Shiffrin, Bob French, Joe Halpern for exciting discussions on the topic.
